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Russia’s development assistance
Agata Wierzbowska-Miazga
Marcin Kaczmarski
In its attempts to catch up with the global trend, Russia began granting 
development assistance in 2004. From the onset of Russia’s commitment, 
the aid delivered has increased fivefold and reached approximately US$ 
500 million in 2010. Russian aid, albeit distributed nearly exclusively via 
international organisations, has been granted above all to members of the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). In recent months work on 
the establishment of the Russian development assistance system has been 
accelerated (a national strategy is being prepared and a specialised agency 
is to be established). This move proves that the Kremlin attaches weight to 
activity in this area which is an element of soft power politics, the founda-
tions of which Moscow is currently attempting to lay. 
In its commitment to development co-operation Russia has sought on the 
one hand to increase its prestige on the international stage and on the 
other hand to gain another instrument of exerting its ascendancy in the CIS. 
The scale of aid and the way of delivering it have not made Russia an impor-
tant global actor. Over the last five years Russia increased the funding allo-
cated to development assistance several times, however, compared to other 
donors its aid does not appear impressive. The resources dedicated to this end 
stand at a mere 0.035% of Russian GDP. Unlike other non-Western superpo-
wers such as China or India, Russia is not a competitor for Western countries 
in this area on the global scale. Nevertheless, within the CIS, Russia’s aid is 
building the country’s position as a donor. The long-term results of this aid are 
however being counteracted by the fact that Russia is expecting measurable 
and direct political and economic benefits in return. Although this policy helps 
Moscow achieve its objectives in the CIS, it does not develop Russian potential 
in the sphere of soft power or create a positive image of the country. 
International development assistance today 
Development assistance is nowadays one of key methods for building a country’s interna-
tional position. It combines the carrying out of foreign policy objectives, soft power activi-
ties, the promotion of defined political rules (good governance) and the fulfilment of the 
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commitments made by richer countries towards poorer countries. Development assistance 
has both practical (measured by increased political and economic influences) and presti-
ge aspects. The provision of development assistance also serves the purposes of actions 
undertaken in the donor’s country such as the strengthening the non-governmental sector 
(which is responsible for delivering a large part of aid), the promotion of business, and awa-
reness raising of global issues in society. 
After the end of the cold war development assistance was monopolised by Western coun-
tries. These countries, grouped together in the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), until the mid-2000s 
accounted for 95% of the funding allocated for development purposes (Arab countries also 
delivered development aid, though). The OECD DAC has also become one of the sources of 
concepts and rules regulating Official Development Assistance (ODA). The DAC countries 
opted for conditionality of provided assistance, making aid dependent on the implementa-
tion of political and economic transformations. At the same time, attempts were made to 
separate development assistance from strategic objectives of foreign policy (by promoting 
divorcing development aid from immediate benefits or by using grants instead of loans). 
With the appearance of new centres of economic growth, other countries, from emerging 
superpowers such as China, India, Brazil and South Africa, through EU New Member States 
to private donors such as Bill and Melinda Gates’ foundation, have joined traditional donors 
since the mid-2000s. Their overall contribution amounted to over US$ ten billion a year be-
tween 2008 and 2010. With the arrival of new sources of funding development assistance, 
its objectives and principles have started changing. Development assistance provided by 
new donors has several characteristics. Firstly, it is focused on the region in the immedia-
te vicinity (with China – Asia, with North 
Korea as the largest recipient; with India 
– its neighbouring countries; for Brazil – 
Latin American countries; it is also simi-
lar for Turkey and for South Korea, which 
is a DAC member state). Secondly, new 
donors shift away from the principle of 
conditionality and underline non-inference 
with the recipient country’s internal affairs. 
Thirdly, for new donors development assi-
stance often provides a way of winning political influence and access to strategic resources, 
which is best illustrated by the example of China’s policy towards Africa. Fourthly, China 
for instance presents itself as a developing country and promotes co-operation on an equal 
footing (South-South co-operation). In connection with this the very notion of a developing 
country has been diluted as the countries which qualify as such according to OECD criteria, 
from China to India, are delivering increasing amounts of development aid and establishing 
specialised agencies to perform this task. New donor countries are presenting a challenge 
to the already established development assistance system dominated by Western countries, 
despite the fact that their contribution is under fifteen per cent of global development assi-
stance. The aid granted by them often runs contrary to the principles developed by Western 
countries (such as the realisation above all of the interests of the beneficiaries and not of 
the donor, the separation from direct benefits, harmonisation between donors) and is also 
perceived as supporting authoritarian regimes and lowering standards. 
In 2010 Official Development Assistance altogether totalled US$ 130 billion. The largest 
donor countries are the US with US$ 30 billion and the EU with US$ 70 billion. In com-
parison, the aid provided by China stood at US$ 2.5 billion, by India at US$ 1 billion, by 
Turkey at approximately US$ 1 billion and by Poland at US$ 380 million. 
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The Russian concept of development assistance
With the growing importance of development co-operation Russia – which is attempting to 
adjust its foreign policy to the requirements of the post-cold war order dominated by econo-
mic issues and copying the soft power methods used by Western countries – has decided 
to also provide development assistance. Since 2004 Moscow has been allocating funds for 
development aid., In 2004 it also made the first – failed – attempt to establish a system 
of development assistance (although several years ago Russia itself met the development 
assistance recipient criteria). 
Initially, Russia’s development assistance policy was implemented on the basis of one-off 
governmental decisions – with no internal documents regulating this question. In 2005 
Russia signed the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness – a fundamental document which 
defines the principles of development aid on the international scale, created mainly by the 
OECD. However, the internal principles of granting development aid by Russia were first for-
mulated in the Concept of Russia’s Participation in International Development Assistance, 
signed by Vladimir Putin on 25 June 2007. They have been working on a national strategy 
for development policy since 2010.
Despite the commonly declared motivations such as the need to build a stable and safe 
world, Russia also explains its commitment to supporting developing countries by referring 
to prestige issues – the need to follow in the footsteps of the world’s richest countries who 
are its colleagues in the G8 group – and the willingness to build its positive image. 
In reaction to a visible global tendency which sees the steady growth of resources dedicated 
to development aid Russia has recognised that it must activate its development policy and 
increase related funding if the country wants to enjoy the status of world superpower. 
Russia does not hide that the aid it delivers is intended to bring about political and economic 
benefits not only to recipient countries but also and possibly above all – to Russia itself. 
In the Concept of Russia’s Participation in International Development Assistance it is clearly 
stated that Russia’s development aid is meant first and foremost to encourage the building 
of ties with Russia’s neighbouring countries, to stabilise the region and to stimulate the in-
tegration processes of recipients’ national 
markets with Russian capital, goods and 
services and labour markets. The majori-
ty of the world’s donor countries pursue 
development policies in line with their 
own political and economic goals, their 
self-interest is however not so explicitly 
formulated in related documents or does 
not dominate the fundamental goal of development assistance, that being support for deve-
loping countries and the elimination of poverty. 
From 2012 the activities of the Russian development policy will be undertaken by a speciali-
sed agency affiliated to the Ministry of Finance. At present responsibility for development aid 
is dispersed. Decisions about providing aid to particular countries are made by the government 
at the initiative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Finance. The executive 
authorities of neighbouring regions with potential recipient countries can also take initiative 
in this area. Preference is granted to programmes whose implementation involves the use of 
Russian goods – opinions in these matters are issued by the Ministry of Industry and Energy. 
The Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States, Compatriots Living Abroad 
and International Humanitarian Co-operation, Rossotrudnichestvo, is trying to play the role of 
the coordinator of development activities undertaken by Russia in the territory of the CIS, but 
it is involved in an ongoing dispute over competences with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
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Russia’s development policy is implemented only in country-to-country relations, with inter-
national organisations acting as possible intermediaries. In contrast to global practice, the 
sector of non-governmental organisations, either from Russia or recipient countries, is not 
involved in development assistance. In the Concept of Russia’s Participation in International 
Development Assistance, it is stated that non-governmental organisations through the pro-
jects they implement are often part of development activities and create a positive backgro-
und for actions undertaken by the state. The idea of providing federal funding for civil society 
and non-governmental organisations so that they can be used as an additional channel to 
deliver Russia’s assistance to the recipient countries is being considered for the future. 
The practice of Russian development assistance 
The first form of assistance provided by Russia to developing countries was the cancellation 
of debts incurred by developing countries in the USSR era, above all as part of the Heavily 
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative aimed at reducing debts in these countries, laun-
ched jointly by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in 1996. This form of 
aid was easy as the cancelled debts were difficult to recover anyway. 
The impetus for initiating an active development policy in 2004 was provided by Russia’s 
preparations to take the lead in the G8 group. 
Russian development assistance (in US$ million)
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Amount 100 100 100 210 220 785 472
In the forthcoming years Russia is planning to maintain development assistance at the 
level of US$ 0.5 billion (which is equivalent to approximately 0.035% of its GDP). 2009 
was exceptional because of the crisis and substantial money transfers to Kyrgyzstan, in the 
coming years aid will remain at the level of US$ 500 million. At the same time Russia has 
declared its willingness to reach the level 
recommended by the UN of development 
aid of 0.7%, which would equate to ap-
proximately US$ 11 billion annually. 
With the increase in funding for develop-
ment assistance, the aid structure has 
also been changing. More emphasis is 
being placed on grants and subventions. 
For the time being the bulk of Russian as-
sistance is made up by contributions to 
international funds and ODA programmes which stem from Russia’s commitments as a G8 
member. Thus Russia is not pursuing its own development programme but only joining the 
framework provided by the international institutions – above all the World Bank, the World 
Health Organisation and UN agencies. 
However, a certain specialisation can be seen in Russia’s commitment – the largest part of funding 
disbursed to development organisations is devoted to health protection (in 2010 approximately 
US$ 80 million was allocated to this purpose, in 2009 this figure was US$ 129.13 million).
In the longer term Russia envisages the establishment and development of instruments 
of the national development assistance system in bilateral form. So far direct assistance 
has been rather incidental. In 2009 the majority of bilateral aid was the support given to 
Kyrgyzstan which then was struggling with an energy crisis – a non-reimbursable grant 
The majority of funds provided 
by Russia bilaterally or multilaterally 
are channelled to CIS countries, par-
ticularly to the states in Central Asia. 
Russian development assistance 
is often closely linked to the imple-
mentation of Russia’s particular goals.
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of US$ 150 million and a preferential long-term loan of US$ 300 million. In 2010 it was 
Kyrgyzstan, Nicaragua and Nauru which each received US$ 50 million in grants in order 
to solve social issues. 
The majority of funds provided by Russia bilaterally or multilaterally are channelled to CIS 
countries, particularly to the states in Central Asia. Russia is also planning to launch a de-
velopment programme aimed at the CIS countries - “Assistance and partnership”. Further-
more, in 2009 Russia and the Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC) countries announced 
the establishment of a new mechanism of assistance in crisis situations - the Anti-Crisis 
Fund of the EAEC amounting to US$ 10 billion, where Russia’s contribution stood at US$ 
7.5 billion. This fund is intended to deliver aid to the least developed countries following 
ODA principles. Tajikistan, which received US$ 63 million (from Russian contributions) 
in 2010, was the first beneficiary of the fund. 
Russian development assistance is often closely linked to the implementation of Russia’s 
particular goals. Several times in exchange for support (particularly bilateral) Russia has 
gained immediate benefits, which is contrary to the widely accepted rules of development 
assistance. The flagship example of tying aid to the realisation of particular demands was 
demonstrated by the aid delivered to Nicaragua and Nauru after which the two countries 
recognised the independence of Georgia’s separatist republics – Abkhazia and South Osse-
tia. In return for assistance for Kyrgyzstan in 2009 Bishkek, under pressure from Moscow, 
denounced the agreement with the US regarding the deployment of the US military base at 
the Manas airport. At the same time in exchange for cancelling the US$ 180 million debt, 
Russia was set to take over the control package of the Kyrgyz Dastan defence plant. 
Conclusions 
Russian development assistance exemplifies Russia’s attempts to employ soft power meas-
ures in its foreign policy. This aid brings Moscow classic political and economic benefits 
within the CIS. However, this involvement is ineffective as a tool for creating Russia’s image 
as a modern superpower having large soft power potential. The barriers are: a characteristic 
reluctance, also for other attempts of development and the use of soft power instruments, 
or an inability to commit substantial funding and the willingness to gain immediate, direct 
benefits. Due to a small share of bilateral development co-operation and the overlooking of 
non-state channels of delivering aid, Russia has also failed in its aim to inform society in 
the recipient countries. Furthermore, Russia is neglecting the information policy in this area 
by not reporting related expenditure to the OECD; the country is either not noticed by ex-
perts who entirely pass over Russia (whereas they indicate the remaining BRICS countries) 
in discussions about new donors. Thus Moscow, by demonstrating superpower ambitions 
on a global scale, remains on the margins in the area of international development co- 
-operation both in terms of funding and concepts. The case of development co-operation re-
veals that Russia is not faring well with applying modern methods of pursuing foreign policy, 
not only in comparison with Western countries but also with non-Western superpowers.
